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sensitivity. In its present form, Lehrer's model is based on the same underlying mathematical structure as that employed by French and Harary. Initial individual opinions are registered in a matrix which undergoes consensual revision through repeated multiplication by a fixed 'respect matrix'. As presently conceived, this matrix incorporates individuals' evaluations of their colleagues relative to an entire hierarchy of judgmental skills. A physicist, for example, will receive from his colleagues a single summary weight as a scientist, a judge of scientists, a judge of judge of scientists, etc. Convinced of the desirability of refining this model to incorporate subtler analyses of the parameters of respect, Lehrer posed to me the mathematical problem of taking specific account of the different levels of respect. While the present article is intended primarily as sequel to his papers on rational social choice, it is entirely possible that the refined normative model presented here may also be of value to those interested in descriptive approaches to group decision-making. 1
PRELIMINARIES
In practice, group consensus typically emerges from an unstructured discussion in which individuals modify their initial opinions on the basis of a complex set of considerations. Such discussion will involve exchange not only of indisputable facts. and inferences, but also of interpretations, intuitions, and guesses which cannot be supported by rigorous logical or statistical arguments. A group under no compulsion to come to an immediate decision might, of course, exclude such impressionistic data from consideration, and decline to conclude their deliberations unless enough hard data emerges to settle the issue. But groups unable to afford the luxury of additional research may be forced to evaluate softer kinds of data and to incorporate such evaluations into their decision. Here, attention does (and should) shift from a consideration of the data to an evaluation of the individual who advocates its cogency. If such considerations have appeared to some as an unjustifiable intrusion into any truly rational decision-making process, it is perhaps because they have been employed in unsystematic ways. Thus it is of particular interest to develop systematic theories of group decision-making in which the respect accorded members of the group by each other plays an explicit role in the achievement of consensus.
Lehrer [7] has investigated two such theories, each based on the same underlying mathematical structure. In both, the starting point is an n x m matrix A = (ai), where ai represents individual i's opinion as to the most appropriate value of variable j (we suppose that there are n individuals and m variables). Individuals are assumed to have arrived at these values after a complete discussion, so that the matrix A represents what is termed a state of 'dialectical equilibrium'. In the face of disagreement at this stage, members of the group construct, after full discussion, an n x n matrix P = (iP) of nonnegative real numbers with Pi, + Pi2 + +Pin = 1 for all i = i, 2, ..., n.
The entry P,i expresses the weight which individual i grants to individual j (and hence to values in the jth row of A) on the basis of his respect for i's expertise and sensitivity, and may be regarded as measuring i's estimate of the chance that i's opinion a1 is, in the relevant sense, correct. Two methods are proposed for employing this additional 'social information': Method I. Each individual i revises his opinion, ai1, of the most appropriate value of variable j to a(J) = Pi aIi + Pi2 a21 + + Pin an1, averaging his own initial opinion with those of his colleagues according to the weighting scheme he has contributed to P. The resulting n x m matrix of revised values, A(') = (aW)), which is simply the matrix product PA, may have identical rows. In such a case, consensus obtains. If not, the above process is iterated, yielding the sequence A(1) = PA, A(2) = PA1) = P(PA), A(3) =PA (2) = P(P(PA)), etc. By associativity of matrix multiplication, it follows that A (n) = PXA. Even if none of the matrices A(n) exhibits consensus, the matrices pn may converge (as n approaches infinity) to a matrix P* with identical rows. (The theory of Markov chains guarantees that this will be the case, for example, when all entries of P are strictly positive.) If each row of P* has entries p1, P2, , Pn, then A (n) converges to the consensus matrix A * = P*A. Every entry in the jth column of A * is equal to the consensual weighted average P 1 ai + p2 a21 + * + Pnani, and this number represents the group's consensus as to the most appropriate value of variable j. The foregoing is essentially the descriptive model of French and Harary recast in normative terms. As such it requires additional rationalization of the iteration procedure employed. If the entries of P are parameters of power, experience suggests that iteration may at least roughly approximate the repeated episodes of resistance and acquiescence involved in everyday group decision-making (although there are obviously situations where the parameters of power change, even radically, over time). But repeated multiplication by a matrix of weights freely chosen does not appear to be as compel-ling. Assuming that the move from A to PA is unobjectionable (since individuals construct P with precisely this move in mind), one may argue that, once it is carried out, individuals have granted to each others' opinions all of the additional weight which they intended. Hence further multiplication by P is gratuitious. It is asserted in [7] that an individual who rejects further iteration is repudiating the weights which he has granted to others and, in effect, giving himself unit weight and the others no weight. Such an individual will respond that he is doing nothing of the kind, pointing to his acceptance of the move from A to PA, and protesting that he has cooperated in the construction of P, only to discover that it is P* which is to be employed in weighted averaging. Thus it seems clear that a rationalization of iteration will require that P express social information of a more complex kind.
Alethod II. The above procedure yields almost as an incidental byproduct, the sequence PI, P2, , PI of consensual weights. This suggests that attention be focused on determining such a sequence in an acceptable way. Iteration of this procedure yields the sequence p, pp = p2, (pp)p = p3, ((PP)P)P = P4, etc. The increasing powers of P represent repeated attempts to resolve the lack of consensus in P. Should P be such that these powers converge to a limit consensus matrix P*, then any of the (identical) rows of P* will furnish a consensual set of weights P 1, Pn with which to average the columns of A.
The mathematical structures underlying Methods I and II are, of course, identical. But the conceptual differences between the techniques are signi-ficant, for Method II takes specific account of the complex hierarchy of social information. Indeed, a group employing the second method on a given initial matrix A may arrive at a different consensus than they would have using the first method. For the broader considerations involved in constructing P under Method II may yield a matrix of weights different from that which would have been chosen under Method I.
While Method II provides stronger justification for the kind of iteration it employs, it remains defective in several respects. First (and this applies to Method I as well), one may argue, opinions of a group in dialectical equilibrium have already been influenced by the patterns of respect quantified in P. Individuals have adopted the interpretations, intuitions, and guesses of others to the extent warranted by their respect. Hence granting any additional weight constitutes a distortion. In addition, individuals using Method II face the delicate task of incorporating into P their respect for others relative to a theoretically infinite hierarchy of judgmental skills. If one is convinced, say, that good physicists are always equally good judges of physicists (and judges of judges of physicists, etc.) one may not object to employing the single matrix P under the theoretically infinite number of interpretations required by Method II. But a method which aims at maximal sensitivity to all relevant information should, as Lehrer has suggested, furnish subtler analyses of the parameters of respect. In the following section we present a refinement of Method II designed to answer the above criticisms.
THE METHOD OF PROXY MATRICES
If one considers the process by which groups typically arrive at a state of dialectical equilibrium, one may quite reasonably conclude that multiplication of A by any other matrix constitutes an unwarranted double weighting of information about the expertise of members of the group. For such information is almost inevitably taken into account during the discussion preceding arrival at dialectical equilibrium. Clearly, it is only by restructuring that discussion process that one can defend modification of the matrix A.
Fortunately, there is a way of doing this which is not merely an unobjectionable modification of ordinary practice but, in some respects, an actual improvement upon it. We simply stipulate that discussion shall take place through repeated exchange of anonymous position papers. These papers will contain everything that would be involved in a face-to-face discussion. But individuals will of necessity evaluate the opinions of others without taking into account the identity of the authors. They will thus delay final evaluation of the more impressionistic assertions of others, having at this point incomplete criteria for such an evaluation. When dialectical equilibrium is reached, This number, which is independent of i, is the group consensus regarding the most appropriate value of variable j. Should consensus fail for P1 in dialectical equilibrium, the group is informed of the authors of the most recent set of position papers, and there is an exchange of anonymous position papers regarding construction of a proxy matrix P2 = (pa3)). The number pfj) represents that part of a unit vote which i is willing to proxy to j in the determination of P1, and is based on i's estimate of j as a contributor to that enterprise. If consensus obtains in P2, the group replaces P1 by P2Pi, which will also be a consensus matrix (see Section 4), and derives from it, as above, consensual weighted averages of the columns of A. Each failure of consensus results in an attempt to resolve disagreement through the additional information contained in a proxy matrix of higher order. Thus, at least in theory, the group may construct an infinite sequence P1, P2, P3, ... of proxy matrices in its search for consensus. The sequence of products P1, P2 P1 , (P3 P2 )P1, ((P4 P3 )P2 )Pi represent repeated attempts to find a consensus matrix with which to average the columns of the initial matrix A. Even if consensus fails in each Pi, the sequence of products may be converging to a consensus matrix. Before turning to the mathematics of convergence, however, we wish to make some general observations about the foregoing technique.
By stipulating that dicussion take place through exchange of anonymous position papers, the revised method answers the objection that any weighted averaging of the columns of A is redundant. For exclusively new information is introduced in each proxy matrix. In addition, the procedure envisioned allows individuals the freedom to evaluate the opinions of others initially without being influenced by knowledge of the source of such opinions. This insures equally careful attention to the hard data presented by all individuals, thus maximizing the recognition of intersubjectively verifiable information.
Each proxy matrix, moreover, captures a particular kind of information about the judgmental skills of members of the decisionmaking group. Nothing precludes, say, an individual's receiving substantial weight as a physicist, but substantially less weight as a judge of physicists. Finally, by a careful partitioning of the task of weighing individual opinions, we have been able to fumish a clearer derivation of the weighted averages employed in earlier analyses. We turn now from the construction of proxy matrices to some mathematical observations about their products. We recall that a proxy matrix is a square matrix with nonnegative entries and unitary row sums, and that a consensus matrix is any matrix with identical rows. A typical decision-making problem generates an initial n x m matrix A and a sequence Pl, P2, ... of n x n proxy matrices. Denote by A(k) the product PkPk-l ... P1 A. We wish to discover conditions under which A (k) will converge to a consensus matrix.
CONVERGENCE TO CONSENSUS: THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY

Construction of a matrix
Several simple preliminary observations are of interest. First, it is easy to check that if Q is any consensus matrix with n rows and P is any n x n proxy matrix, then PQ = Q. Thus consensus, once achieved, is undisturbed by subsequent multiplication by proxy matrices. If, for some k, A(k) is a con-sensus matrix, construction of higher order proxy matrices is superfluous. This is, in fact, intuitively obvious, for if all agree on the assignment of a value to a particular variable, votes, however they are proxied, will all be cast on behalf of that value. Thus if the proxy matrices PI, P2, ... are identically equal to some regular matrix. P, as in earlier models, group opinion will converge to consensus. This condition is, however, considerably stronger than necessary. For it is in fact the case (although this does not appear to be widely known4) that mere convergence of the sequence P1, P2, ... to a regular limit matrix P is sufficient to ensure that the sequence of products P1, P2P1, P3P2P1, ... converges to a consensus limit matrix. For if P is regular, there is a natural number d such that pd has exclusively nonzero entires.5 Since the Pi converge to P, there is some k for which i > k implies that Pi will have nonzero entries at every loca-tion where P has nonzero entries. Hence beyond k, products of successive blocks of d Pi's will be matrices with exclusively nonzero entries. It can then be shown that there is a fixed positive lower bound on these entries, from which convergence to consensus follows by the standard Markov chain argument.6 Since there are regular n x n matrices with as few as n + 1 positive entries,7 it is clear that patterns of rather minimal respect among individuals can nevertheless yield consensus by the proxy method.
Second, if P is an n x n consensus proxy matrix and Q is any matrix with n rows, then PQ is a consensus matrix. For if the rows
SOME FURTHER REFINEMENTS
Products of proxy matrices represent an improvement upon powers of a single respect matrix with respect to sensitivity to different levels of judgmental skills. But even proxy matrices appear to collapse complex considerations to a single 'score'. An individual involved, say, in the allocation of research funds to a number of grant applicants may, it seems, have good rational reasons for weighing a colleague's evaluations of certain applicants more heavily than that colleague's evaluations of other applicants. But the method, as presently conceived, applies the weight p0/) which i grants to jin PI unifornly to j's evaluations (i.e., to every entry in the jth row of A). Now if the variables corresponding to the columns of A are unrelated, the group can simply seek consensus in A one column at a time, employing a (possibly) different sequence of proxy matrices for each of these decision problems.
It is often the case, however, that the variables in question are related by a constraint on their sum. Allocations from a fixed budget to several competing projects, and probability estimates for a class of mutually exclusive, exhaustive events, are cases in point. If the group achieves consensus in such cases one variable at a time, the consensual values of the variables in question may sum to a value which falls short of or exceeds the required sum. (It is easy to construct examples of each of these phenomena.) Suppose that the numbers a1, a2, ..., ak denote these consensual values, and the sum of these numbers differs from s, the sum required by the constraints of the problem. One might argue that a number ai represents, at any rate, the group consensus as to the relative share of s to be allocated to variable i. It is then a simple matter to normalize the sequence a1, a2, ..., ak to the sequence ia, a2, ..., ak, where Wi = ai s/a1 + a2 + -?ak, producing thereby an allocation which satisfies the operative constraint.
This may be an unobjectionable way of proceeding in-certain kinds of decision problems. For problems involving variables which represent probability estimates, however, this gambit appears to be rather ad hoc. Indeed, it is our contention that one ought not to use it at all. For the single 'score' P fJ) ( To see how such considerations may be incorporated into a decision-making process using the techniques at hand, let us consider the problem of allocating funds from a fixed sum, s, to m competing projects. The n individuals involved in this task identify a set of r mutually exclusive and exhaustive criteria upon which to evaluate the projects. These criteria will vary considerably with the problem at hand. They may be imposed by external guidelines, or chosen by the decision-making group (in which case any criterion which any individual feels is relevant will be included). Instead of constructing a single n x m allocation matrix A, the individuals construct nn x m matrices A1, A2, ..., Ar, where the i-jth entry of At denotes individual i's best estimate of that part of the total funds which should be allocated to project j, if criterion t were the sole consideration involved. The group then works to modify each of the matrices At to a consensus matrix, employing the method of proxy matrices. Different sequences of proxy matrices may arise for each of these problems, reflecting the realistic fact that an individual may be quite expert, say, at evaluating projects based on the criterion of potential ecological value, and somewhat less expert at an evaluation based on the criterion of potential value in alleviating unemployment.
Suppose that the group reaches agreement in the form of a sequence A , A2, ...A of n x m consensus matrices. Denote by a(t, j) the consensual allocation to project j based solely on criterion t (so that for each t, we have a(t, 1) + a(t, 2) + --* + a(t, k) = s). The individuals now turn their attention to deciding upon a consensual sequence w1, w2, ... wr (with 0 < wi < 1 and Wl + W2 + -Wr = 1) of weights to attach to the r criteria employed above. In some decision-making situations these weights may be imposed by external guidelines. If not, the group proceeds in the usual way, constructing first an n x r matrix W = (wit), where 0 6w?it <1, wi 1 + wi2 + ?-+ Wir = 1 for all i, and wit denotes individual i's best estimate of the weight which should be given to criterion t. In the face of disagreement, the method of proxy matrices is used in an attempt to achieve consensus. It consensual weights w1, w2, ..., Wr emerge, then, for each j, the weighted average a1 = w 1 a (1, j) + w2 a (2, j) + * + wra(r, j) represents the group's final allocation to project j. (Note that al + + ak = s.) We remark that if a decision-making task involves estimating the probability of some event j, then the above method simply amounts to (1) identifying a class of r mutually exclusive, exhaustive events, (2) estimating their probabilities w1, w2, ..., wr, and the conditional probabilities a(l, A), a(2, j), ..., a(r, j) of event j, given each of these events, and (3) combining this information in the standard way to yield the estimate, a1, of the unconditional probability of that event.
The above method, which is often informally followed in practice, is clearly a superior way of incorporating information about the differential abilities of an individual with respect to decision-making at some fixed level. While we illustrated the application of this method to the search for consensus regarding values of the primary variables in a decision problem, it is obviously applicable to the construction of proxy matrices as well. Thus instead of constructing a single proxy matrix PI in which individuals rank each others' skill at evaluating the primary variables according, say, to a criterion of potential ecological value, the group might construct a sequence of such matrices, each capturing information about some component aspect of this skill (such as expertise in biology or chemistry, or talent in quantitative or systems analysis). Consensual values in these matrices would then be averaged by a set of weights expressing the group consensus as to the relative importance of these constitutive skills to the overall enterprise. In theory the group may choose this approach to constructing a proxy matrix at any level, but it is likely in practice not to be employed beyond the level of second order proxy matrices.
We mentioned briefly above that the set of criteria upon which a decisionmaking group makes determinations of the variables in question, as well as the weights to be granted to those criteria, might be stipulated by some other group. In such situations, one has in effect a larger decision-making group partitioned into two classes. Individuals in the first class choose the weighted evaluation criteria, and are thus responsible for 'values'. Those in the second class assign numbers to the variables in question according to these criteria, and are thus responsible for 'facts'. This partitioning of deliberative responsibilities is a particularly appropriate way to approach public policy questions which involve scientific considerations. Citizen groups or their representatives determine the weighted criteria by which alternative courses of action are to be judged, and groups of experts provide quantitative analyses of the alternatives according to these criteria. Pi A will be an e-consensus matrix. 3 Kemeny and Snell (41, p. 70. 4 The case of 'backwards' products P1 P2 ... Pk (which are the natural generalization of powers pk when the Pi are transition matrices of a nonhomogeneous Markov process) is treated in Seneta [8] . 5 It is an interesting mathematical fact that the smallest d for which this is the case never exceeds n2 -2n + 2. See Seneta [8] for a proof of this theorem. 6 
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